Gás de efeito estufa do sistema de comércio de emissões

Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS)
O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE foi explicado.
O sistema de comércio de emissões da UE (EU ETS) é uma pedra angular da política da UE para combater as alterações climáticas e o seu instrumento fundamental para reduzir as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa de forma rentável. É o primeiro grande mercado de carbono do mundo e continua sendo o maior deles.
opera em 31 países (todos os 28 países da UE mais a Islândia, Liechtenstein e Noruega) limita as emissões de mais de 11.000 instalações que utilizam energia pesada (centrais elétricas e plantas industriais) e as companhias aéreas que operam entre esses países cobrem cerca de 45% das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa da UE emissões.
Para uma visão geral detalhada, consulte:
Um sistema 'cap and trade'.
O EU ETS trabalha no princípio do limite e comércio.
Um limite é definido na quantidade total de certos gases de efeito estufa que podem ser emitidos pelas instalações cobertas pelo sistema. O limite é reduzido ao longo do tempo para que as emissões totais caiam.
Dentro do limite, as empresas recebem ou compram permissões de emissão que podem negociar umas com as outras conforme necessário. Eles também podem comprar quantidades limitadas de créditos internacionais de projetos de redução de emissões em todo o mundo. O limite do número total de permissões disponíveis garante que elas tenham um valor.
Após cada ano, uma empresa deve entregar licenças suficientes para cobrir todas as suas emissões, caso contrário, multas pesadas são impostas. Se uma empresa reduz suas emissões, ela pode manter as licenças de reposição para cobrir suas necessidades futuras ou então vendê-las para outra empresa que não possui licenças.
O comércio traz flexibilidade que garante que as emissões sejam cortadas onde custa menos. Um preço robusto de carbono também promove investimentos em tecnologias limpas e de baixo carbono.
Principais características da fase 3 (2013-2020)
O EU ETS está agora em sua terceira fase - significativamente diferente das fases 1 e 2.
As principais mudanças são:
Aplica-se um único limite de emissões à escala da UE em vez do anterior sistema de limites nacionais O leilão é o método predefinido para atribuir licenças (em vez de atribuição gratuita) e as regras de atribuição harmonizadas aplicam-se às licenças ainda gratuitas. os gases incluíram 300 milhões de licenças reservadas na New Entrants Reserve para financiar a implantação de tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável e captura e armazenamento de carbono por meio do programa NER 300.
Setores e gases cobertos.
O sistema cobre os seguintes setores e gases com foco nas emissões que podem ser medidas, reportadas e verificadas com um alto nível de precisão:
dióxido de carbono (CO 2) da geração de energia e calor - setores intensivos em energia, incluindo refinarias de petróleo, siderúrgicas e produção de ferro, alumínio, metais, cimento, cal, vidro, cerâmica, polpa, papel, papelão, ácidos e produtos químicos orgânicos a granel Óxido nitroso (N 2 O) da aviação comercial a partir da produção de ácidos nítrico, adípico e glioxílico e de perfluorocarbonetos glioxálicos (PFC) a partir da produção de alumínio.
A participação no EU ETS é obrigatória para empresas nestes setores, mas.
em alguns setores, apenas plantas acima de um determinado tamanho são incluídas. Algumas pequenas instalações podem ser excluídas se os governos implementarem medidas fiscais ou outras medidas que reduzirão suas emissões em um valor equivalente no setor de aviação; até 2016, o EU ETS se aplica apenas a vôos entre aeroportos situados no Espaço Económico Europeu (EEE).
Entregando reduções de emissões.
O EU ETS provou que colocar um preço no carbono e comercializá-lo pode funcionar. As emissões das instalações do regime estão a diminuir como previsto - cerca de 5% em comparação com o início da fase 3 (2013) (ver dados de 2015).
Em 2020, as emissões dos setores abrangidos pelo sistema serão 21% menores do que em 2005.
Desenvolvendo o mercado de carbono.
Criado em 2005, o EU ETS é o primeiro e maior sistema internacional de comércio de emissões do mundo, respondendo por mais de três quartos do comércio internacional de carbono.
O EU ETS também está inspirando o desenvolvimento do comércio de emissões em outros países e regiões. A UE pretende ligar o EU ETS a outros sistemas compatíveis.
Legislação principal do EU ETS.
30/04/2014 - Versão consolidada da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, relativa à criação de um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 23/04/2009 - Diretiva 2009/29 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Diretiva 2003/87 / CE no sentido de melhorar e tornar extensivo o regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 19/11/2008 - Diretiva 2008/101 / CE do o Parlamento Europeu e o Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE de modo a incluir as actividades da aviação no regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade 27/10/2004 - Directiva 2004/101 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho o Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, relativa à criação de um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade, no âmbito dos mecanismos de projecto do Protocolo de Quioto 13/10/2003 - Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho ncil que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho.
Relatórios do mercado de carbono.
23/11/2017 - COM (2017) 693 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 01/02/2017 - COM (2017) 48 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 18/11/2015 - COM ( 2015) 576 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 14/11/2012 - COM (2012) 652 - A situação do mercado europeu do carbono em 2012.
Revisão do EU ETS para a fase 3.
04/02/2011 - Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de 4 de fevereiro de 2011 (ver conclusões 23 e 24) 18/03/2010 - Orientações sobre a interpretação do anexo I da Diretiva RCLE-UE (excluindo atividades de aviação) 18/03/2010 - Orientação documento para identificação dos geradores de electricidade 06/04/2009 - Comunicado de imprensa do Conselho sobre a adopção do pacote clima-energia 12/12/2008 - Conclusões da Presidência do Conselho Europeu (11 e 12 de Dezembro de 2008) 12/12/2008 - Conselho Europeu Declaração sobre a utilização das receitas dos leilões 23/01/2008 - Proposta de Directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE no sentido de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 23 / 01/2008 - Documento de trabalho dos serviços da Comissão - Documento de acompanhamento da proposta de diretiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Diretiva 2003/87 / CE no sentido de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa - Avaliação de impacto.
Implementação.
04/07/2013 - Projecto de Regulamento Alterado relativo à determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/06/2013 - Projecto de Regulamento sobre a determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/05/2013 Regulamento (UE) n. º 389/2013 da Comissão, de 2 de maio de 2013, que cria um Registo da União nos termos do à Diretiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, Decisões n. º 280/2004 / CE e n. º 406/2009 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que revoga os Regulamentos (UE) n. º 920/2010 da Comissão e N. ° 1193/2011 Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE 18/11/2011 - Regulamento da Comissão que estabelece um Registo da União para o período de negociação com início em 1 de janeiro de 2013 e os períodos de comércio subsequentes do regime de comércio de direitos de emissão da União nos termos da Diretiva 2003/87 / CE Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e Decisão 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que altera os Regulamentos (CE) n. º 2216/2004 e (UE) n. º 920/2010 - ainda não publicados no Jornal Oficial 07 / 10/2010 - Regulamento da Comissão (UE) no 920/2010 relativa a um sistema de registos normalizado e protegido, em conformidade com a Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e a Decisão no 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão sem incluir as alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de novembro de 2011 08/10/2008 - Regulamento (CE) n. o 994/2008 da Comissão relativo a um sistema de registos normalizado e protegido, nos termos da Diretiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e Decisão n. º 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão aplicável até 31 de Dezembro de 2011 26/10/2007 - Decisão Misto do Comité Misto do EEE n. º 146/2007, que liga o RCLE-UE à Noruega, à Islândia e ao Liechtenstein 13/11 / 2006 - Decisão 2006/780 / CE da Comissão, relativa à redução da duplicação das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa no âmbito do regime comunitário de comércio de licenças de emissão no âmbito do Protocolo de Quioto, nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho (n sob nº C (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - Versão consolidada do Regulamento (CE) nº 2216/2004 da Comissão para um sistema de registos normalizado e protegido, com a redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) nº 916/2007 da Comissão, de 31 de Julho 2007, Regulamento (CE) n. o 994/2008 da Comissão, de 8 de Outubro de 2008, e Regulamento (UE) n. o 920/2010 da Comissão, de 7 de Outubro de 2010 - versão sem alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de Novembro de 2011.
Aplicação do IVA.
História da Legislação da Directiva 2003/87 / CE.
Trabalhar antes da proposta da Comissão.
08/02/2000 - COM (2000) 87 - Livro Verde sobre comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa na União Europeia Mandato e resultados do Grupo de Trabalho 1 da ECCP: Mecanismos flexíveis 04/09/2001 - Resumo Resumido do Presidente da reunião de consulta das partes interessadas (com a indústria ONG ambientais e ambientais 19/05/1999 - COM (1999) 230 - Preparativos para a implementação do Protocolo de Quioto 03/06/1998 - COM (1998) 353 - Alterações climáticas - Rumo a uma estratégia pós-Quioto da UE Âmbito do RCLE UE : 07/2007 - Pequenas Instalações dentro do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE 10/2006 - Inclusão de atividades e gases adicionais no Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE Maior harmonização e maior previsibilidade: 12/2006 - A abordagem para novos entrantes e encerramentos 10/2006 - Leilão de licenças de emissão de CO2 na EU ETS 10/2006 - Harmonização de metodologias de alocação 12/2006 - Relatório sobre a competitividade internacional Grupo de trabalho da ECCP sobre o comércio de emissões na revisão do EU ETS 15/06/2007 - Relatório final da 4ª reunião Ligação em Sistemas de Comércio de Emissões em Terceiros Países 22/05/2007 - Relatório final da 3ª reunião sobre Harmonização Adicional e Previsibilidade Aumentada 26/04/2007 - Relatório Final da 2ª reunião sobre Cumprimento e Cumprimento Robustos 09/03/2007 - Relatório final da primeira reunião sobre o âmbito da directiva.
Proposta da Comissão de Outubro de 2001.
22/01/2002 - Não-documento sobre sinergias entre a proposta de comércio de emissões da CE (COM (2001) 581) e a Directiva IPPC 23/10/2001 - COM (2001) 581 - Proposta de directiva-quadro relativa ao comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade Europeia.
Reacção da Comissão à leitura da proposta no Conselho e no Parlamento (incluindo a posição comum do Conselho)
18/07/2003 - COM (2003) 463 - Parecer da Comissão sobre as alterações do Parlamento Europeu à posição comum do Conselho respeitante à proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho 20/06/2003 - COM (2003) 364 - Comunicação da Comissão ao Parlamento Europeu relativa à posição comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE 18/03/2003 - Posição Comum ) 28.2003 - Posição Comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 27/11/2002 - COM (2002) 680 - Proposta alterada de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho.
Abra todas as perguntas.
Perguntas e Respostas sobre o Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE revisado (dezembro de 2008)
Qual é o objetivo do comércio de emissões?
O objetivo do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS) é ajudar os Estados Membros da UE a cumprir seus compromissos de limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases de efeito estufa de maneira econômica. Permitir que as empresas participantes comprem ou vendam licenças de emissão significa que os cortes de emissões podem ser alcançados pelo menos pelo custo.
O EU ETS é a pedra angular da estratégia da UE para combater as alterações climáticas. É o primeiro sistema internacional de comércio de emissões de CO 2 no mundo e está em funcionamento desde 2005. A partir de 1 de Janeiro de 2008, aplica-se não só aos 27 Estados-Membros da UE, mas também aos outros três membros do Espaço Económico Europeu. - Noruega, Islândia e Liechtenstein. Actualmente, abrange mais de 10 000 instalações nos sectores da energia e da indústria, que são colectivamente responsáveis ​​por quase metade das emissões de CO 2 da UE e por 40% das suas emissões totais de gases com efeito de estufa. Uma emenda à Diretiva EU ETS, acordada em julho de 2008, trará o setor da aviação para o sistema a partir de 2012.
Como funciona o comércio de emissões?
O EU ETS é um sistema de limite e comércio, ou seja, ele limita o nível geral de emissões permitidas, mas, dentro desse limite, permite que os participantes do sistema comprem e vendam licenças conforme necessário. Essas permissões são a "moeda" de negociação comum no coração do sistema. Uma licença concede ao titular o direito de emitir uma tonelada de CO2 ou a quantidade equivalente de outro gás com efeito de estufa. O teto do número total de permissões cria escassez no mercado.
No primeiro e segundo período de comércio no âmbito do regime, os Estados-Membros tiveram de elaborar planos nacionais de atribuição (NAP) que determinam o nível total de emissões do RCLE e o número de licenças de emissão que cada instalação recebe no seu país. No final de cada ano, as instalações devem devolver licenças equivalentes às suas emissões. As empresas que mantêm suas emissões abaixo do nível de suas permissões podem vender seus excedentes de licenças. Aqueles que enfrentam dificuldades em manter suas emissões alinhadas com seus subsídios têm uma escolha entre tomar medidas para reduzir suas próprias emissões - como investir em tecnologia mais eficiente ou usar fontes de energia menos intensivas em carbono - ou comprar as permissões extras necessárias no mercado. , Ou uma combinação de ambos. Tais escolhas são provavelmente determinadas por custos relativos. Dessa forma, as emissões são reduzidas onde quer que seja mais econômico fazê-lo.
Há quanto tempo o EU ETS está operando?
O EU ETS foi lançado em 1 de janeiro de 2005. O primeiro período de comércio durou três anos até o final de 2007 e foi uma fase de 'aprender fazendo' para se preparar para o segundo período de comércio crucial. O segundo período de comércio teve início em 1 de janeiro de 2008 e dura cinco anos até o final de 2012. A importância do segundo período de comércio decorre do fato de coincidir com o primeiro período de compromisso do Protocolo de Quioto, durante o qual a UE e outras os países industrializados devem cumprir suas metas para limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases de efeito estufa. Para o segundo período de comércio, as emissões do RCLE-UE foram limitadas em cerca de 6,5% abaixo dos níveis de 2005 para ajudar a garantir que a UE como um todo, e os Estados-Membros individualmente, cumpram os seus compromissos de Quioto.
Quais são as principais lições aprendidas com a experiência até agora?
O EU ETS colocou um preço no carbono e provou que o comércio de emissões de gases de efeito estufa funciona. O primeiro período de comércio estabeleceu com êxito a livre negociação de licenças de emissão em toda a UE, criou a infraestrutura necessária e desenvolveu um mercado dinâmico de carbono. Os benefícios ambientais da primeira fase podem ser limitados devido à atribuição excessiva de licenças em alguns Estados-Membros e alguns sectores, devido principalmente a uma dependência das projecções das emissões antes de os dados das emissões verificadas se tornarem disponíveis no âmbito do RCLE-UE. Quando a publicação dos dados de emissões verificadas para 2005 destacou essa “superalocação”, o mercado reagiu como seria esperado, baixando o preço de mercado das permissões. A disponibilidade de dados de emissões verificadas permitiu à Comissão assegurar que o limite para as dotações nacionais na segunda fase seja estabelecido a um nível que resulte em reduções reais das emissões.
Para além de sublinhar a necessidade de dados verificados, a experiência até à data demonstrou que uma maior harmonização no âmbito do RCLE-UE é imperativa para garantir que a UE atinja os seus objetivos de redução de emissões pelo menor custo e com distorções de concorrência mínimas. A necessidade de mais harmonização é mais clara no que diz respeito ao modo como é estabelecido o limite para as licenças de emissão globais.
Os dois primeiros períodos de comércio mostram também que os métodos nacionais amplamente divergentes de atribuição de licenças a instalações ameaçam a concorrência leal no mercado interno. Além disso, é necessária uma maior harmonização, clarificação e aperfeiçoamento no que diz respeito ao âmbito do sistema, ao acesso a créditos de projectos de redução de emissões fora da UE, às condições de ligação do RCLE-UE aos sistemas de comércio de emissões noutros locais e à monitorização, verificação e requisitos de relatórios.
Quais são as principais mudanças no EU ETS e a partir de quando elas serão aplicadas?
As alterações de projeto acordadas serão aplicadas a partir do terceiro período de comércio, ou seja, janeiro de 2013. Embora o trabalho preparatório seja iniciado imediatamente, as regras aplicáveis ​​não serão alteradas até janeiro de 2013 para assegurar que a estabilidade regulatória seja mantida.
O EU ETS no terceiro período será um sistema mais eficiente, mais harmonizado e mais justo.
O aumento da eficiência é conseguido através de um período de comércio mais longo (8 anos em vez de 5 anos), um limite de emissões robusto e decrescente anual (redução de 21% em 2020 comparado a 2005) e um aumento substancial na quantidade de leilões. 4% na fase 2 para mais da metade na fase 3).
Foi harmonizada mais harmonização em muitos domínios, incluindo no que diz respeito à fixação de limites (limite máximo à escala da UE em vez dos limites nacionais nas fases 1 e 2) e às regras para a atribuição gratuita a título transitório.
A equidade do sistema foi substancialmente aumentada pela passagem para regras de atribuição de licenças de emissão em toda a UE para as instalações industriais e pela introdução de um mecanismo de redistribuição que permite aos novos Estados-Membros leiloar mais licenças.
Como o texto final se compara à proposta inicial da Comissão?
As metas climáticas e energéticas acordadas pelo Conselho Europeu da Primavera de 2007 foram mantidas e a arquitectura global da proposta da Comissão sobre o RCLE-UE permanece intacta. Ou seja, haverá um limite máximo a nível da UE sobre o número de licenças de emissão e este limite diminuirá anualmente ao longo de uma linha de tendência linear, que continuará para além do final do terceiro período de comércio (2013-2020). A principal diferença em relação à proposta é que o leilão de licenças será introduzido gradualmente.
Quais são as principais alterações em relação à proposta da Comissão?
Em resumo, as principais alterações feitas na proposta são as seguintes:
Alguns Estados-Membros podem beneficiar de uma derrogação facultativa e temporária da regra segundo a qual nenhuma atribuição deve ser atribuída a geradores de eletricidade a partir de 2013. Esta opção de derrogação está à disposição dos Estados-Membros que preencham determinadas condições relacionadas com a interconexão da sua eletricidade. rede, quota de um único combustível fóssil na produção de electricidade e PIB / capita em relação à média da UE-27. Além disso, o montante de licenças gratuitas que um Estado-Membro pode atribuir às centrais eléctricas está limitado a 70% das emissões de dióxido de carbono das instalações relevantes na fase 1 e diminui nos anos seguintes. Além disso, a atribuição a título gratuito na fase 3 só pode ser concedida a centrais eléctricas em funcionamento ou em construção, o mais tardar no final de 2008. Ver resposta à pergunta 15 abaixo. A directiva conterá mais pormenores sobre os critérios a utilizar para determinar os sectores ou subsectores considerados expostos a um risco significativo de fuga de carbono e uma data anterior de publicação da lista da Comissão sobre esses sectores (31 de Dezembro). 2009). Além disso, sujeito a revisão quando for alcançado um acordo internacional satisfatório, as instalações em todas as indústrias expostas receberão 100% de licenças gratuitas na medida em que usem a tecnologia mais eficiente. A alocação gratuita à indústria é limitada à participação das emissões dessas indústrias no total de emissões em 2005 a 2007. O número total de permissões alocadas gratuitamente a instalações em setores industriais declinará anualmente de acordo com o declínio do limite de emissões. Os Estados-Membros podem igualmente compensar certas instalações por custos de CO 2 repercutidos nos preços da electricidade se os custos do CO 2 os pudessem expor ao risco de fuga de carbono. A Comissão comprometeu-se a alterar as orientações comunitárias em matéria de auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente. Veja a resposta à questão 15 abaixo. O nível de leilões de licenças para a indústria não exposta aumentará de forma linear, como proposto pela Comissão, mas, em vez de atingir 100% até 2020, atingirá 70%, tendo em vista atingir 100% até 2027. Tal como previsto Na proposta da Comissão, 10% dos subsídios para leilão serão redistribuídos dos Estados Membros com alta renda per capita para aqueles com baixa renda per capita, a fim de fortalecer a capacidade financeira destes últimos de investir em tecnologias favoráveis ​​ao clima. Foi adicionada uma provisão para outro mecanismo redistributivo de 2% das licenças de emissão em leilão, a fim de ter em conta os Estados-Membros que, em 2005, conseguiram uma redução de pelo menos 20% das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa em comparação com o ano de referência estabelecido pelo Protocolo de Quioto. A percentagem de receitas leiloadas que os Estados-Membros devem utilizar para combater e adaptar-se às alterações climáticas, principalmente na UE, mas também nos países em desenvolvimento, é aumentada de 20% para 50%. O texto prevê um complemento para o nível de uso permitido de créditos de IC / MDL no cenário de 20% para operadores existentes que receberam os orçamentos mais baixos para importar e usar tais créditos em relação a alocações e acesso a créditos no período 2008-2012. Novos setores, novos entrantes nos períodos 2013-2020 e 2008-2012 também poderão usar créditos. O montante total dos créditos que poderão ser utilizados não excederá, no entanto, 50% da redução entre 2008 e 2020. Com base numa redução de emissões mais rigorosa no contexto de um acordo internacional satisfatório, a Comissão poderá permitir acesso adicional às RCE e URE. para os operadores do regime comunitário. Veja a resposta à questão 20 abaixo. O produto do leilão de 300 milhões de permissões da reserva de novos operadores será usado para apoiar até 12 projetos e projetos de demonstração de captura e armazenamento de carbono, demonstrando tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável. Várias condições estão associadas a este mecanismo de financiamento. Veja a resposta à questão 30 abaixo. A possibilidade de optar por pequenas instalações de combustão, desde que sujeitas a medidas equivalentes, foi alargada a todas as pequenas instalações independentemente da actividade, o limiar de emissões aumentou de 10.000 para 25.000 toneladas de CO 2 por ano e o limiar de capacidade que instalações de combustão tem que cumprir, além disso foi elevado de 25MW para 35MW. Com estes limiares aumentados, a percentagem de emissões abrangidas que potencialmente seriam excluídas do sistema de comércio de emissões torna-se significativa e, consequentemente, foi adicionada uma provisão para permitir uma redução correspondente do limite de licenças a nível da UE.
Ainda haverá planos nacionais de alocação (NAPs)?
Não. Nos seus PAN nos primeiros (2005-2007) e no segundo (2008-2012) períodos de comércio, os Estados-Membros determinaram a quantidade total de licenças a emitir - o limite - e como estas seriam atribuídas às instalações em causa. Esta abordagem gerou diferenças significativas nas regras de alocação, criando um incentivo para que cada Estado-Membro favoreça o seu próprio setor e tenha levado a uma grande complexidade.
A partir do terceiro período de comércio, haverá um limite único a nível da UE e as licenças serão atribuídas com base em regras harmonizadas. Os planos nacionais de atribuição não serão, portanto, mais necessários.
Como será determinado o limite de emissões na fase 3?
As regras para o cálculo do limite a nível da UE são as seguintes:
A partir de 2013, o número total de licenças diminuirá anualmente de maneira linear. O ponto de partida desta linha é a quantidade total média de licenças (fase 2 limite) a ser emitida pelos Estados Membros para o período 2008-12, ajustada para refletir o escopo ampliado do sistema a partir de 2013, bem como quaisquer instalações pequenas que os Países Membros Estados optaram por excluir. O fator linear pelo qual a quantidade anual deve diminuir é de 1,74% em relação ao limite da fase 2.
O ponto de partida para determinar o fator linear de 1,74% é a redução geral de 20% dos gases de efeito estufa em relação a 1990, o que equivale a uma redução de 14% em relação a 2005. No entanto, uma redução maior é exigida do EU ETS porque é mais barato reduzir as emissões nos sectores do RCLE. A divisão que minimiza o custo total de redução é:
uma redução de 21% nas emissões do setor RCLE-UE em relação a 2005 até 2020; uma redução de cerca de 10% em relação a 2005 para os sectores não abrangidos pelo RCLE-UE.
A redução de 21% em 2020 resulta em um teto ETS em 2020 de um máximo de 1720 milhões de permissões e implica um limite médio de 3ª fase (2013 a 2020) de cerca de 1846 milhões de permissões e uma redução de 11% em comparação com o limite da fase 2.
Todos os números absolutos indicados correspondem à cobertura no início do segundo período de negociação e, portanto, não levam em conta a aviação, que será adicionada em 2012, e outros setores que serão adicionados na fase 3.
Os valores finais para os limites anuais de emissões na fase 3 serão determinados e publicados pela Comissão até 30 de Setembro de 2010.
Como será determinado o limite de emissões além da fase 3?
O fator linear de 1,74% usado para determinar o limite da fase 3 continuará a ser aplicado além do final do período de comércio em 2020 e determinará o limite para o quarto período de comércio (2021 a 2028) e além. Pode ser revisto até 2025, o mais tardar. De fato, reduções significativas de emissão de 60% -80% em relação a 1990 serão necessárias até 2050 para alcançar o objetivo estratégico de limitar o aumento da temperatura média global a não mais que 2 ° C acima dos níveis pré-industriais.
Um limite de licenças de emissão para toda a UE será determinado para cada ano. Isto reduzirá a flexibilidade das instalações em causa?
Não, a flexibilidade para instalações não será reduzida de forma alguma. Em qualquer ano, as licenças de emissão a serem leiloadas e distribuídas devem ser emitidas pelas autoridades competentes até 28 de fevereiro. A última data para os operadores devolverem licenças é 30 de abril do ano seguinte ao ano em que as emissões ocorreram. Assim, os operadores recebem licenças para o ano em curso antes de terem de devolver as licenças para cobrir as suas emissões do ano anterior. As tolerâncias permanecem válidas durante todo o período de negociação e quaisquer provisões excedentes podem agora ser "depositadas" para uso em períodos de negociações subseqüentes. Nesse aspecto, nada mudará.
O sistema permanecerá baseado em períodos de negociação, mas o terceiro período de negociação durará oito anos, de 2013 a 2020, em oposição a cinco anos para a segunda fase, de 2008 a 2012.
Para o segundo período de comércio, os Estados-Membros decidiram geralmente atribuir quantidades totais iguais de licenças para cada ano. A redução linear a cada ano a partir de 2013 corresponderá melhor às tendências esperadas de emissões no período.

Participar no Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS)
Introdução ao Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE, incluindo como funciona o sistema de limitação e comércio, como as licenças são alocadas, detalhes sobre conformidade, inclusão da aviação no Sistema e o esquema de desativação do Reino Unido para pequenos emissores e hospitais.
Cap e comércio.
Os participantes que provavelmente emitem mais do que sua alocação têm a opção de tomar medidas para reduzir suas emissões ou comprar subsídios adicionais; quer do mercado secundário - por exemplo, empresas que detêm licenças que não precisam - quer de leilões detidos pelos Estados-Membros. Mais informações estão disponíveis no site EU ETS: mercados de carbono.
Não importa onde (em termos de localização física) as reduções de emissões são feitas porque a economia de emissões tem o mesmo efeito ambiental onde quer que elas sejam feitas.
O raciocínio por trás do comércio de emissões é que ele permite que as reduções de emissões ocorram onde o custo da redução é menor, diminuindo o custo total de lidar com as mudanças climáticas.
Como funciona a negociação: um exemplo hipotético simplificado.
A instalação B, no entanto, emitiu 220Mt de CO2 porque precisava aumentar sua capacidade de produção e era muito caro investir em tecnologia de eficiência energética.
Por conseguinte, a instalação B comprou licenças do mercado, disponibilizadas porque a instalação A conseguiu vender as suas licenças adicionais.
O efeito líquido é que o investimento na redução de carbono ocorre no local mais barato, e as emissões de CO2 são limitadas às 400 permissões emitidas para ambas as instalações.
Fases de entrega do Sistema de Negociação de Emissões.
Fase I (1 de Janeiro de 2005 a 31 de Dezembro de 2007)
Esta fase está completa. Maiores detalhes sobre essa fase podem ser vistos na versão do Arquivo Nacional do DECC: EU ETS Fase I.
Fase II (1 de janeiro de 2008 a 31 de dezembro de 2012)
Fase III (1 de janeiro de 2013 a 31 de dezembro de 2020)
Atribuição gratuita de licenças.
Além disso, os setores industriais em risco significativo de competição de países sem custos similares de carbono (ver seção sobre vazamento de carbono no EU ETS para obter mais informações) são elegíveis para receber uma proporção maior de permissões de graça.
Em 2011, os Estados-Membros foram obrigados a apresentar à Comissão Europeia uma lista do número preliminar de licenças gratuitas a conceder a cada instalação industrial na fase III, designadas por «medidas nacionais de execução» ou «NIM». O Reino Unido apresentou suas MRE à Comissão Européia em 12 de dezembro de 2011, e subseqüentemente apresentou MNI modificados em abril de 2012.
Atribuição gratuita da Fase III conforme aprovada nas Medidas Nacionais de Implementação do Reino Unido.
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Tabela nacional de alocação do Reino Unido: alocação gratuita da Fase III incluindo mudanças na alocação: junho de 2014.
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UK National Allocation Table: Phase III National Allocation including changes: April 2015.
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Carbon leakage and the EU ETS.
The best way to address carbon leakage would be a legally binding international climate agreement. This would create a level playing field for industry inside and outside the EU with respect to accounting for the costs of carbon.
The second mechanism allows Member States to compensate sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage as a result of indirect EU ETS costs (ie through EU ETS - related increases in electricity prices), provided that schemes are designed within the framework set by the European Commission (see section on indirect carbon leakage compensation scheme for more information).
The UK government strongly supports the principle of free allocation in the absence of an international climate agreement. We believe that the proportionate free allocation of allowances gives relief to sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage, without raising barriers to international trade. We are concerned however that those most at risk may not be compensated sufficiently in the future if current EU ETS rules are not reformed for Phase IV of the EU ETS .
The UK government recognises industry concerns around competitiveness and carbon leakage and is committed to ensuring that sectors genuinely at significant risk of carbon leakage are protected from this risk. In June 2014, we published a research project commissioned by the Department of Energy and Climate Change and undertaken by Vivid Economics and Ecofys, which investigates the occurrence of carbon leakage so far and the fundamental drivers of carbon leakage for a selection of industrial sectors and assesses the measures in place for its mitigation.
The report models the risk of carbon leakage for 24 industrial sectors, and was produced in consultation with industry stakeholders. Modelling analysis shows that in the absence of any mitigating policy measures (such as free allocation of allowances), no allowance for carbon abatement potential, and no increase in carbon regulation outside of the European Union, a number of sectors are at risk of leakage. Given these assumptions, the modelling analysis shows higher rates of carbon leakage than would be expected to occur in reality. The views expressed in the report are those of its writers, and do not represent an official position of the UK government.
The final report, case studies and associated peer review are available:
Assessment of carbon leakage status for the free allocation of allowances.
Sectors at risk of carbon leakage are assessed against a set of criteria and thresholds set out in the EU ETS Directive. The list of sectors deemed at risk of leakage for the period 2013-2014 were agreed through the EU comitology procedure in December 2009, with additions to the list made in subsequent European Commission Decisions.
On 31 August 2013, the UK responded to the European Commission’s consultation on the methodology for determination of the carbon leakage list for 2015 to 2019.
Indirect carbon leakage compensation scheme.
In the 2011 Autumn Statement, the Chancellor announced that the government intended to implement measures to reduce the impact of policy on the costs of electricity for the most electricity-intensive industries, beginning in 2013 and worth around £250 million over the Spending Review period.
The European Commission adopted revised State Aid guidelines on compensation for the indirect costs of the EU ETS in June 2012. These guidelines list the sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage due to indirect emissions costs, and provide details of the maximum levels of compensation that can be made available to them. Any Member State compensation scheme must be designed within the framework set by the European Commission.
In October 2012, DECC and BIS launched the energy intensive industries compensation scheme consultation, which set out our proposals for the eligibility and design of the compensation package.
The consultation, which closed in December 2012, provided an opportunity for all those interested in the package to comment on the proposals, helping us ensure that compensation is targeted at those companies who are most at risk of carbon leakage as a result of energy and climate change policies.
For Carbon Price Floor compensation, which remains subject to state aid approval from the European Commission, we expect to publish guidance later in the summer and begin payments shortly thereafter.
New Entrants Reserve.
Further information on allowances can be found on the EU ETS : allowances page.
Complying with the EU ETS.
Regulators include: the Environment Agency, Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA), Natural Resources Wales, the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) for offshore installations.
For more information on how to comply with EU ETS please visit:
Monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation.
Finding an accredited EU ETS verifier in the UK.
Include the following information in your email:
name of verifier organisation country accreditation identification number a copy of your accreditation certificate full name and email address of the main point of contact (this user will have the responsibility for managing other users for this verifier)
To apply for a verifier Registry account, email etregistryhelp@environment-agency. gov. uk for an application pack.
Further guidance.
Using UK greenhouse gas inventory data in EU ETS monitoring and reporting: the country-specific factor list.
The European Commission’s Regulation on Monitoring and Reporting allows nationally reported data to be used as default factors in specific circumstances.
Carbon emission factors and calorific values from the UK Greenhouse Gas Inventory (AEA-Ricardo) are available for annual emissions reporting for the EU ETS :
Emission factors and calorific values for 2017.
MS Excel Spreadsheet , 81.7KB.
The national factors are Tier 2 and Tier 2a emission factors and net calorific values for specific fuels used by particular industries.
The factors in these tables should only be used in accordance with the requirements in an installation’s approved monitoring plan, which is part of the Greenhouse Gas permit.
Tables for previous years are available as follows:

Emissions trading system greenhouse gas

Greenhouse gas emissions a new commodity.
Parties with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Parties) have accepted targets for limiting or reducing emissions. These targets are expressed as levels of allowed emissions, or assigned amounts, at over the 2008-2012 commitment period. The allowed emissions are divided into assigned amount units (AAUs).
Emissions trading, as set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows countries that have emission units to spare - emissions permitted them but not "used" - to sell this excess capacity to countries that are over their targets.
Thus, a new commodity was created in the form of emission reductions or removals. Since carbon dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas, people speak simply of trading in carbon. Carbon is now tracked and traded like any other commodity. This is known as the "carbon market."
Other trading units in the carbon market.
More than actual emissions units can be traded and sold under the Kyoto Protocols emissions trading scheme.
Transfers and acquisitions of these units are tracked and recorded through the registry systems under the Kyoto Protocol.
An international transaction log ensures secure transfer of emission reduction units between countries.
The commitment period reserve.
In order to address the concern that Parties could "oversell" units, and subsequently be unable to meet their own emissions targets, each Party is required to maintain a reserve of ERUs, CERs, AAUs and/or RMUs in its national registry. This reserve, known as the "commitment period reserve", should not drop below 90 per cent of the Party's assigned amount or 100 per cent of five times its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lowest.
Relationship to domestic and regional emissions trading schemes.
Emissions trading schemes may be established as climate policy instruments at the national level and the regional level. Under such schemes, governments set emissions obligations to be reached by the participating entities. The European Union emissions trading scheme is the largest in operation.
on modalities, rules and guidelines for emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol more >>
on modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7.4 of the Kyoto Protocol more >>

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in U. S. States.
Observations and Lessons from the OTC NOx Budget Program.
Reviews the performance of a multi-state emissions trading program for nitrogen oxides (NOx), implemented by states in the Ozone Transport Commission. Based on this review, recommendations are made for multi-state emissions trading for greenhouse gases.
Executive Summary.
A number of U. S. states are considering market-based policies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The experience gained from emissions trading for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) offers a useful body of information and data to draw on to design a GHG emissions trading system. This report examines NOx trading under the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NOx Budget Program, which resulted principally from the leadership, decisions, and actions by a group of states, ultimately becoming the first multilateral cap-and-trade system for emissions of air pollutants.
The OTC NOx Budget Program proved to be effective on economic, environmental, and administrative grounds. From 1999 to 2002, annual emissions were significantly reduced, and the program had no discernable effect on the region’s economic vitality. Beginning in 2003, the OTC NOx Budget Program was incorporated into a larger federal system with similar features. That is, the successful state-based program facilitated the adoption of broader emissions control. Critical to this development was the leadership and innovation by the states, which provided valuable information, data, and a set of committed stakeholders.
For GHG emissions, various aspects of the problem make it well suited to a market-based approach that can spur innovation among a wide variety of sources and sectors. Though there is presently little federal prompting for GHG emissions reductions, the experience with NOx trading should provide confidence for states to take the initiative. States can start with GHG emissions controls, gain experience, and lead the near-term innovation in emissions control technologies and strategies. Over time, this may facilitate broader control at a national scale commensurate with the reductions required in global emissions.

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Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme.
MAJOR POLICIES.
Korea will implement the greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme starting in 2015. The “Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits” was enacted in 2012 and basic research necessary for formulating a national emission permit allocation plan and detailed guideline was carried out in 2013. In January 2014, the Korea Exchange was designated as an emission permits exchange, and an exchange system has since been in construction. A mock exchange will be held among target businesses in October. The “National Emission Permit Allocation Plan” will be formulated in 2014; it will include a comprehensive operation plan for the first phase (2015 to 2017), covering such aspects as allocations by sector and allocation standards for each business. The Ministry of Environment was designated as the single competent authority to ensure efficient and consistent scheme operation.
The emissions trading scheme is a system in which the government allocates emission permits to greenhouse gas-emitting businesses, requiring them to keep their emissions within the allocated emission limit and allowing them to trade any post-reduction surplus or shortage of emission permits with other businesses. Firms with a high reduction capacity (low marginal abatement costs) can achieve greater reductions and sell surplus emission permits on the emission permits market, and those with a low reduction capacity (high marginal abatement costs) can cut costs by purchasing emission permits to address shortages instead of directly reducing emissions.
Businesses subject to allocation of emission permits are those with total annual greenhouse gas emissions of 125,000 tons of CO2e or higher, and corresponding businesses of establishments of 25,000 tons of CO2e or higher.
The total emissions allowance set for each country is allocated to each sector and emission permits are then allocated to individual establishments. Emission permits are allocated for free or by auction. Allocation will be 100% free during the first phase of the plan from 2015 to 2017. The proportion of auctioned allocation will be gradually increased to 3% in 2018 and at least 10% in 2021 to reduce the industrial burden in the early stages of implementation and facilitate the soft landing of the scheme. To account for international industrial competitiveness, however, 100% free allocation will be available to industries with a high share of experts and energy-focused industries even after 2018.
An establishment that has been allocated with emission permits is required to carry out emission and reduction activities during the period concerned, measure its emissions, and report it to the government after verification by an external agency. The government evaluates the appropriateness and certifies the emission. Emission permits can be submitted as allocated or, in the event of a surplus or shortage, purchased from another establishment. They can also be borrowed from the following year. Offset emission permits (greenhouse gas reduction certified through an external project by a third party outside the establishment) can also be submitted. However, emission permits that are submitted in any way other than allocation are subject to size limits. Borrowing is restricted to 10% of the total emission permit, and offset emission permits are also limited to 10%. Overseas offsets are restricted to 50% of the submission of all offset emission permits. Surplus emission permits can be carried forward to and used in the following year.
A transaction account must be created in the registry in order to trade emission permits. They can be traded bilaterally, but the emission permits exchange provides a safe method. The government has prepared measures to stabilize the emission permits exchange market. It can supply the market with a reserve of emission permits in the event of a sudden price increase or other urgent circumstances and can also set minimum and maximum holding limits, borrowing limits, offset emission permit submission limits, and maximum and minimum prices for emission permits.
For more information, please contact us :
Public Relations Team (mepr@korea. kr)
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Participating in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)
Introduction to the EU Emissions Trading System including how the cap-and-trade System works, how free allowances are allocated, details on complying, the inclusion of aviation in the System and the UK’s opt-out scheme for small emitters and hospitals.
Cap and trade.
Participants who are likely to emit more than their allocation have a choice between taking measures to reduce their emissions or buying additional allowances; either from the secondary market – eg companies who hold allowances they do not need – or from Member State held auctions. More information is available on the EU ETS : carbon markets webpage.
It does not matter where (in terms of physical location) emission reductions are made because emissions savings have the same environmental effect wherever they are made.
The rationale behind emissions trading is that it enables emission reductions to take place where the cost of the reduction is lowest, lessening the overall cost of tackling climate change.
How trading works: a simplified hypothetical example.
Installation B however emitted 220Mt CO2 because it needed to increase its production capacity and it was too expensive for it to invest in energy efficiency technology.
Therefore, installation B bought allowances from the market, which had been made available because installation A has been able to sell its additional allowances.
The net effect is that the investment in carbon reduction occurs in the cheapest place, and CO2 emissions are limited to the 400 allowances issued to both installations.
Delivery phases of the Emissions Trading System.
Phase I (1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007)
This phase is complete. Further details around this phase can be viewed on the National Archives version of the DECC: EU ETS Phase I web page.
Phase II (1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012)
Phase III (1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020)
Free allocation of allowances.
In addition, industrial sectors at significant risk of competition from countries without similar carbon costs (see section on carbon leakage in the EU ETS for more information) are eligible to receive a higher proportion of allowances for free.
In 2011, Member States were required to submit to the European Commission a list of the preliminary number of free allowances to be issued to each industrial installation in Phase III, referred to as ‘National Implementation Measures’ or ‘NIMs ’. The UK submitted its NIMs to the European Commission on 12 December 2011, and subsequently submitted modified NIMs in April 2012.
Phase III free allocation as approved in the UK National Implementation Measures.
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UK National Allocation Table: Phase III free allocation including changes to allocation: June 2014.
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Carbon leakage and the EU ETS.
The best way to address carbon leakage would be a legally binding international climate agreement. This would create a level playing field for industry inside and outside the EU with respect to accounting for the costs of carbon.
The second mechanism allows Member States to compensate sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage as a result of indirect EU ETS costs (ie through EU ETS - related increases in electricity prices), provided that schemes are designed within the framework set by the European Commission (see section on indirect carbon leakage compensation scheme for more information).
The UK government strongly supports the principle of free allocation in the absence of an international climate agreement. We believe that the proportionate free allocation of allowances gives relief to sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage, without raising barriers to international trade. We are concerned however that those most at risk may not be compensated sufficiently in the future if current EU ETS rules are not reformed for Phase IV of the EU ETS .
The UK government recognises industry concerns around competitiveness and carbon leakage and is committed to ensuring that sectors genuinely at significant risk of carbon leakage are protected from this risk. In June 2014, we published a research project commissioned by the Department of Energy and Climate Change and undertaken by Vivid Economics and Ecofys, which investigates the occurrence of carbon leakage so far and the fundamental drivers of carbon leakage for a selection of industrial sectors and assesses the measures in place for its mitigation.
The report models the risk of carbon leakage for 24 industrial sectors, and was produced in consultation with industry stakeholders. Modelling analysis shows that in the absence of any mitigating policy measures (such as free allocation of allowances), no allowance for carbon abatement potential, and no increase in carbon regulation outside of the European Union, a number of sectors are at risk of leakage. Given these assumptions, the modelling analysis shows higher rates of carbon leakage than would be expected to occur in reality. The views expressed in the report are those of its writers, and do not represent an official position of the UK government.
The final report, case studies and associated peer review are available:
Assessment of carbon leakage status for the free allocation of allowances.
Sectors at risk of carbon leakage are assessed against a set of criteria and thresholds set out in the EU ETS Directive. The list of sectors deemed at risk of leakage for the period 2013-2014 were agreed through the EU comitology procedure in December 2009, with additions to the list made in subsequent European Commission Decisions.
On 31 August 2013, the UK responded to the European Commission’s consultation on the methodology for determination of the carbon leakage list for 2015 to 2019.
Indirect carbon leakage compensation scheme.
In the 2011 Autumn Statement, the Chancellor announced that the government intended to implement measures to reduce the impact of policy on the costs of electricity for the most electricity-intensive industries, beginning in 2013 and worth around £250 million over the Spending Review period.
The European Commission adopted revised State Aid guidelines on compensation for the indirect costs of the EU ETS in June 2012. These guidelines list the sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage due to indirect emissions costs, and provide details of the maximum levels of compensation that can be made available to them. Any Member State compensation scheme must be designed within the framework set by the European Commission.
In October 2012, DECC and BIS launched the energy intensive industries compensation scheme consultation, which set out our proposals for the eligibility and design of the compensation package.
The consultation, which closed in December 2012, provided an opportunity for all those interested in the package to comment on the proposals, helping us ensure that compensation is targeted at those companies who are most at risk of carbon leakage as a result of energy and climate change policies.
For Carbon Price Floor compensation, which remains subject to state aid approval from the European Commission, we expect to publish guidance later in the summer and begin payments shortly thereafter.
New Entrants Reserve.
Further information on allowances can be found on the EU ETS : allowances page.
Complying with the EU ETS.
Regulators include: the Environment Agency, Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA), Natural Resources Wales, the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) for offshore installations.
For more information on how to comply with EU ETS please visit:
Monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation.
Finding an accredited EU ETS verifier in the UK.
Include the following information in your email:
name of verifier organisation country accreditation identification number a copy of your accreditation certificate full name and email address of the main point of contact (this user will have the responsibility for managing other users for this verifier)
To apply for a verifier Registry account, email etregistryhelp@environment-agency. gov. uk for an application pack.
Further guidance.
Using UK greenhouse gas inventory data in EU ETS monitoring and reporting: the country-specific factor list.
The European Commission’s Regulation on Monitoring and Reporting allows nationally reported data to be used as default factors in specific circumstances.
Carbon emission factors and calorific values from the UK Greenhouse Gas Inventory (AEA-Ricardo) are available for annual emissions reporting for the EU ETS :
Emission factors and calorific values for 2017.
MS Excel Spreadsheet , 81.7KB.
The national factors are Tier 2 and Tier 2a emission factors and net calorific values for specific fuels used by particular industries.
The factors in these tables should only be used in accordance with the requirements in an installation’s approved monitoring plan, which is part of the Greenhouse Gas permit.
Tables for previous years are available as follows:

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in U. S. States.
Observations and Lessons from the OTC NOx Budget Program.
Reviews the performance of a multi-state emissions trading program for nitrogen oxides (NOx), implemented by states in the Ozone Transport Commission. Based on this review, recommendations are made for multi-state emissions trading for greenhouse gases.
Executive Summary.
A number of U. S. states are considering market-based policies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The experience gained from emissions trading for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) offers a useful body of information and data to draw on to design a GHG emissions trading system. This report examines NOx trading under the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NOx Budget Program, which resulted principally from the leadership, decisions, and actions by a group of states, ultimately becoming the first multilateral cap-and-trade system for emissions of air pollutants.
The OTC NOx Budget Program proved to be effective on economic, environmental, and administrative grounds. From 1999 to 2002, annual emissions were significantly reduced, and the program had no discernable effect on the region’s economic vitality. Beginning in 2003, the OTC NOx Budget Program was incorporated into a larger federal system with similar features. That is, the successful state-based program facilitated the adoption of broader emissions control. Critical to this development was the leadership and innovation by the states, which provided valuable information, data, and a set of committed stakeholders.
For GHG emissions, various aspects of the problem make it well suited to a market-based approach that can spur innovation among a wide variety of sources and sectors. Though there is presently little federal prompting for GHG emissions reductions, the experience with NOx trading should provide confidence for states to take the initiative. States can start with GHG emissions controls, gain experience, and lead the near-term innovation in emissions control technologies and strategies. Over time, this may facilitate broader control at a national scale commensurate with the reductions required in global emissions.

Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
An overview of rules and developments in major jurisdictions globally, including the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, the UK and the EU.
Navigating greenhouse gas emissions schemes worldwide.
As global emissions trading systems undergo fundamental changes, understanding the policies and rules around them can alert you to opportunities as well as challenges.
The impacts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to be of great concern globally. Innovations have occurred in market-based solutions, technology development and international law, and there are 17 GHG emissions trading schemes that have been established globally, operating in 35 countries, 12 states and seven cities.
These trading schemes present a market-based approach to controlling GHG emissions and mitigating the effects of climate change by limiting the quantity of industrial discharges of GHGs, either through the allocation or purchase of emissions allowances from a central authority or the purchase of emissions credits from market participants. For example, a company that emits more GHGs than its permits allow can buy credits from others willing to sell them. GHG emissions credit units are often known as carbon credits or GHG emission-reduction credits.
With the 2013 – 2020 Kyoto Protocol compliance period coming to an end, meeting intended nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement has opened up new challenges, and the resulting changes are confronting GHG emissions trading globally. These changes include economic dynamics, which have lowered the value of emission-reduction credits and have affected the marketplace, potential political opposition to the policies underlying GHG emissions trading and the rise of cost-effective innovations in fnancing GHG emissions reductions.
This report offers readers an overview of the status of GHG emissions trading schemes in major jurisdictions globally, including the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Union. It illustrates the current status of global GHG emissions trading systems and also offers insights into where the global GHG emissions trading system is headed, alerting readers to potential opportunities and challenges.
Estados Unidos.
Individual states are expected to take the lead in regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
United States: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
Individual states are expected to take the lead in regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
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In the US, the trading of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission-reduction credits is underway in a large group of states on the East Coast and in California. In the northeast US, New England states and a group of Mid-Atlantic states joined together to set up a carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) cap-and-trade regime that covers CO 2 emissions from power plants in those states. On the West Coast, California's broader trading regime, which covers a wide range of GHGs from a variety of California emitters, is looking to expand to markets outside of the state.
On the federal level however, signs are pointing to lighter regulation of GHG emissions. This results from a combination of factors, including the actions of the Trump administration and pending legal challenges to the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s plans for regulation of GHG emissions. Therefore, individual states—rather than the federal government—are expected to take the lead with the development of GHG emissions regulation over the next four years.
The trading of greenhouse gas emission reduction credits is underway in a large group of states on the East Coast and in California.
NEW ENGLAND, NEW YORK, MARYLAND AND DELAWARE.
The nine states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont jointly operate a regional CO 2 cap-and-trade system known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This system was the frst US mandatory cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions.
The RGGI trading scheme, which became effective in 2009, applies only to CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel-fred power plants with capacities to generate 25 MWs or more in the nine RGGI states. The RGGI system is therefore narrower than some other regional GHG emissions trading systems that cover GHGs other than CO 2 and that apply to emitters other than power plants.
RGGI applies to emissions reductions within a regional framework, consistent with how the power system in the US operates. Together, the RGGI states set a cap for total emissions of CO 2 from covered power plants in the region. Each state implements the program through emissions caps in individual RGGI-participating states that are equal to shares of the region-wide cap. The RGGI cap declines over time, gradually tightening emissions limits. Covered power plants in participating states must obtain an allowance for each ton of CO 2 emitted annually (RGGI auctions allowances, rather than allocating them for free). Power plants within the region may comply by purchasing allowances at quarterly auctions, purchasing allowances from other generators within the region that have excess allowances or supporting offset projects. RGGI administered its frst auction of CO 2 allowances in 2008.
By 2020, the RGGI CO 2 cap is projected to contribute to a 45 percent reduction in the region's annual power-sector CO 2 emissions from 2005 levels. The RGGI states recently proposed changes to the program after 2020, whereby the region's CO 2 cap would decline by 2.275 million tons of CO 2 per year after 2021, resulting in a reduction in the regional CO 2 cap by 30 percent relative to 2020 levels through 2030. The RGGI states will host a public meeting on this proposal on September 25, 2017. Although Virginia is not an RGGI member, its governor recently directed environmental regulators in that state to cap power plant GHG emissions in Virginia and establish a GHG emissions trading system in the state where credits can be used in, and traded across, similar trading systems in other states. This could potentially include RGGI states. Whether Virginia establishes its trading connection with its East Coast RGGI neighbors or California's regional trading system remains to be seen. Additionally, both major political party gubernatorial candidates competing in New Jersey's upcoming election favor New Jersey's return to RGGI. New Jersey's current governor pulled the state out of the program in 2011.
CALIFORNIA.
The State of California operates one of the most active GHG trading markets in the world, covering a signifcant portion of the state's economy. California's program is second in size to the European Union's Emissions Trading System. The California cap-and-trade rules came into effect in 2013.
Following a 2015 expansion, California's GHG trading scheme applies to power plants and industrial facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more of Co 2 - equivalent, and fuel distributors that meet the 25,000 metric ton threshold. The covered emissions include weighted equivalent values of methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, perfluorocarbons and nitrogen trifluoride, along with Co 2 . This makes the California cap-and-trade system broader than the East Coast's RGGI system because the California system covers emitters other than power plants and GHGs other than CO 2 .
Covered emitters in California must hold enough emissions allowances to cover their emissions, and are free to buy and sell allowances on the open market. Under the California program, some allowances are auctioned, while others are allocated or given away for free. Covered entities in California can also use offsets rather than allowances to cover a limited percentage of their emissions limits. The percentage of free allowances allocated to emitters has been reduced over time.
California's cap-and-trade program is one element of the state's larger climate change initiative, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which aims to reduce the state's GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. On July 25, 2017, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law legislation extending the state's GHG trading program through 2030. Notably, the extension law includes price ceilings and floors and new limits on the use of offsets. Furthermore, it prohibits local air districts from imposing additional limits on CO 2 emissions from facilities subject to the cap-and-trade rules.
California's GHG cap-and-trade system also recently overcame a legal challenge in court. A split panel of judges in California's Third District Court of Appeals recently upheld the program, rejected claims that the state’s auction revenues equate to an unconstitutional tax, and instead found that the costs of buying or selling emissions allowances are property rights that can be traded. Had the court found the revenues to be taxes, the system would have been invalidated because tax increases must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the state Legislature, and the program did not have that level of support when it passed. The California Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of this decision.
California's cap-and-trade system is connected to a similar carbon reduction scheme in Québec, Canada, which is discussed in the Canada section on page 4. This connection represents the first multi-sector cap-and-trade program connection in North America. Under it, allowances can be traded across jurisdictions. Ontario plans to join the program by next year as well.
Nevertheless, some environmental non-governmental organizations oppose cross-border trading system connections because of their belief that GHG emissions reductions should occur directly at the source of the emissions, rather than outside of the jurisdiction where the source is located.
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Environment & Climate Change.
Ontario and Québec lead the way in developing trading schemes.
Canada: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
Ontario and Québec lead the way in developing trading schemes.
Canada's federal government recently entered into an agreement with eight Canadian provinces and three Canadian territories that is likely to accelerate the development of provincial and territorial greenhouse gas (GHG) trading systems. The December 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change Framework outlines a federal benchmark for carbon pricing in Canada. Signatory jurisdictions can implement either (1) an explicit price-based system like a carbon tax or (2) a GHG cap-and-trade system similar to the Québec-California connection, as discussed on page 3. Ontario is following Québec's lead with the development of its own GHG emissions trading scheme.
The Province of Québec's GHG emissions trading scheme is more similar to the California system than it is to the RGGI cap-and-trade initiative. As a result, the Québec scheme has been harmonized with the California system since 2014.
Following an expansion in 2015, Québec's cap-and-trade system now applies to power plants, industrial facilities and fuel distributors. While fuel distributors are subject to a lower threshold, power plants and industrial facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more of carbon dioxide (CO 2 )-equivalent are subject to the provincial regime.
The Québec system covers the same broad suite of GHGs that the California system covers. Covered entities must surrender equivalent allowances to their emissions. Generally, power plants and fuel distributors have to buy 100 percent of their allowances at auction or on the secondary market. Allowances are auctioned jointly with California through the California Cap-and-Trade Program and the Québec Cap-and-Trade System Joint Auction of Greenhouse Gas Allowances. Certain industrial sectors subject to international competition—such as aluminum, cement, chemical, petrochemicals, mining, pulp and paper, and refning—receive some free allowances. However, this allocation of free allowances will continue to diminish over time. Offsets are allowed, subject to quantitative and qualitative limitations. Examples of Québec program offsets include landfll gas collection and destruction of ozone-depleting substances in insulating foam or used as refrigerants removed from refrigeration, freezer and air-conditioning appliances.
By 2020, Québec's system is intended to support a 20 percent provincial reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels.
Offsets issued by California, and any jurisdiction connected with Québec in the future, are recognized for compliance.
The Ontario Cap and Trade Program is relatively new, having only come into effect in January 2017.
The Ontario GHG emissions trading scheme applies to natural gas distributors and industrial emitters that emit 25,000 metric tons or more of CO 2 - equivalent, fuel supplies that supply 200 liters or more of petroleum products, and electricity importers who frst import electricity into Ontario for consumption in cases where generation facilities receive fuel directly from inter-provincial or international gas pipelines.
The Ontario system covers the same broad suite of GHGs that the California and Québec systems cover. Emitters must cover their emissions in each compliance period with an equivalent number of emissions credits. These credits can be obtained through provincial allocations or auctions, or through purchases in the secondary market. Credits can be traded among emitters and other market participants. Offsets can be used to help meet part of a covered entity’s emission requirements under the cap-and-trade program.
The first auction of Ontario emissions allowances was in March 2017. In the first compliance period (January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2020), most large emitters will receive most of the allowances they require free of charge. Following 2017, the number of credits issued by the province will decrease over a three-year period to support a reduction of Ontario's GHG emissions to 15 percent below 1990 levels by the end of 2020.
As discussed above, Ontario intends to connect its GHG trading scheme with the California and Québec regimes by 2018. Once this connection occurs, the three jurisdictions will hold joint auctions of emissions allowances. Emitters in any of the three jurisdictions will be able to purchase credits on the secondary market from covered entities in any of the three jurisdictions.
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Environment & Climate Change.
Implementation of a cap-and-trade program and compliance market is expected by 2021.
Mexico: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
Implementation of a cap-and-trade program and compliance market is expected by 2021.
Stay current on your favorite topics.
In 2012, Mexico enacted the General Law on Climate Change (GCCL), which required the creation of a national registry for greenhouse gases and provided orientation to federal, state and municipal authorities toward the authority to establish a voluntary emissions trading scheme (ETS).
In 2014, the Regulations of the GCCL for the Creation and Operation of the Emissions Registry (the GCCL Regulations) were published, followed by an implementing decree in 2015, recognizing that the first step in establishing an effcient compliance market was implementing an accurate registry of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and compounds.
The GCCL Regulations establish a reporting threshold of 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide (CO 2 )-equivalent, generated annually in all covered facilities operated by a company. Covered facilities include emitters in the energy, industrial, transport, agricultural, waste, commercial and services sectors. Although reports must be filed per facility, the sum of all covered facilities is considered for determining if reporting is required. For example, if a company has six different covered facilities emitting only 5,000 tons/CO 2 - equivalent, it must file a report for each facility, since their total emissions (30,000 tons/CO 2 - equivalent) would exceed the 25,000 tons/ CO 2 - equivalent threshold.
The governments of California, Québec and Ontario are expected to participate as observers during the pilot ETS.
The GCCL Regulations list the GHGs and compounds that must be recorded. This includes the following:
CO 2 Methane Nitrous oxide Carbon black Chlorofluorocarbons Hydrochlorofluorocarbons Hydrofluorocarbons Perfluorocarbons Sulphur hexafluoride Nitrogen trifluoride Halogenated ethers Halocarbons Mixtures of the above GHGs and compounds that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change lists as such and that Mexico's Federal Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) may further publish.
In 2016, SEMARNAT, the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) and MexiCO 2 (a voluntary carbon platform of the BMV) signed an agreement to implement a voluntary pilot ETS for several major companies pertaining to the power generation, manufacturing and transport sectors. Implementation of such a pilot project is currently being discussed, and its purpose is to prepare companies to create a draft ETS regulation by 2018, which would lead to a cap-and-trade program and compliance market (expected to be implemented by 2021).
The governments of California, Québec and Ontario are expected to participate as observers during the pilot ETS, with the purpose of collaborating in the potential linkage between these ETSs. Mexico signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2015 with Québec that includes cooperation on emissions trading, and in 2016, Mexico, Québec and Ontario issued a joint declaration on carbon markets collaboration. This collaboration would be attractive for implementing emission-reduction projects with potential lower costs in Mexico, which may be recognized for compliance in these Canadian provinces, and it is already a possibility in the voluntary market of California, managed by the Climate Action Reserve, which has implemented several protocols for projects that may be implemented in Mexico.
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United Kingdom.
EU's trading scheme framework dominates, but Brexit brings uncertainty.
United Kingdom: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
EU's trading scheme framework dominates, but Brexit brings uncertainty.
Stay current on your favorite topics.
As early as 2002, the UK began preparing for international emissions trading. It initiated a pilot emissions trading scheme (UK ETS) in anticipation of its mandatory contribution toward the EU Kyoto Protocol targets.
The UK ETS was the first cross-industry cap-and-trade greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme of its kind in the world. It applied to certain named installations that were given caps on emissions and allowed these installations to purchase emissions in the event of a shortfall, or sell any excess to those installations that needed them to comply with their obligations under the UK ETS. By the time the EU Emissions Trading Directive came into effect in 2003, the UK had ample experience with pricing, auctions and other mechanics of emissions trading. Today, emissions trading in the UK is predominantly refected in the EU framework, as incorporated into domestic law by the UK Climate Change Act 2008 (CCA) and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations 2009, which have been updated for the current trading period of 2013 to 2020.
The CCA is the core UK statutory basis for climate change mitigation measures. It commits the UK to a target of lowering GHG emissions by the year 2050 to 80 percent below 1990 levels (which translates to 160 MtCO 2 - equivalent emissions). From 2008 to 2012, the UK was capped at 3,018 MtCO 2 , decreasing to 2,782 MtCO 2 between 2013 and 2017. This will further decrease to 2,544 MtCO 2 between 2018 and 2022, and it provides mechanisms by which this target can be achieved. Specifcally, it confers powers to establish trading schemes for the purposes of limiting GHG emissions and encouraging activities that reduce emissions or remove GHG from the atmosphere. In theory, therefore, the UK could participate in any, or multiple, emissions trading schemes worldwide.
In November 2015, the UK reaffirmed its commitment to mitigating climate change on the world stage as a signatory to the Paris Agreement. The UK has developed and submitted its Nationally Developed Contribution (NDC) to achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement.
The Market Stability Reserve is another mechanism introduced to solve the problem of surplus EUAs causing a disincentive to reduce GHG emissions.
What is covered.
The CCA caps the UK's total net GHG emissions each year, and national authorities issue a fixed number of emissions allowances (EUAs) that may be used or traded as required and entitle relevant installations to emit a corresponding quantity of GHG. The UK ETS applies to a range of GHGs—CO 2 methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride. Regardless of the specifc GHG, EUAs are calculated as CO 2 - equivalent emissions, so volumes of each GHG are converted to one ton of CO 2 . One EUA entitles the holder to emit one ton of GHG.
Installations that carry out "regulated activities" beyond a threshold amount must obtain a permit and either buy or be allocated EUAs under the ETS. The threshold for covered installations is thermal input in excess of 20 MWs (i. e., through the combustion of fossil fuel), or the production of certain listed substances such as ammonia or nitric acid, given that GHG is inherently released during the production of such substances.
Covered activities are listed in Annex A of the Regulatory Guidance for Installations. One thousand of the 11,000 covered installations participating in the EU ETS are in the UK. These include power stations, oil refneries, offshore platforms and industries that produce iron and steel, cement and lime, paper, glass, ceramics and chemicals.
What is required.
The "polluter pays" principle applies to environmental protection requirements in the UK. For air emissions permits, the release of GHGs is permitted so long as the "polluting" installations pay for the right to create GHG emissions; that is, installations may only carry out regulated activities up to the number of their allocated EUAs. A proportion of those EUAs are allocated for free, and others must be purchased by auction. EUAs must be used for compliance or may be traded if the installation has a surplus of them.
Given that the aim of the ETS is to progressively reduce GHG emissions, the default position is that EUAs must be acquired at auction, with concessions being made for certain sectors to continue to have a free allocation. Under the UK ETS, each year fewer EUAs are allocated for free and more must be bought at auction. In 2013, installations that received an allocation received 80 percent of it for free. In 2020, covered installations will receive only 30 percent of their EUAs for free, and by 2027 all EUAs must be purchased at auction. Auctions are conducted through an agent (ICE Futures Europe is currently the exchange appointed by the government as the auction agent).
Installations must be able to surrender EUAs corresponding to the amount of GHG they emit each year. If they have insuffcient EUAs to match their emissions, they must either cut their emissions or acquire more EUAs on the open "carbon market." If they have excess, they may save the EUAs for future accounting periods or sell them to other installations. This ensures that emissions are reduced where it costs the least to do so.
Future outlook.
The UK introduced the Carbon Price Floor in 2013 to complement the effectiveness of its emissions trading system. Since the global financial crisis in 2007/2008, industrial output in the UK markedly decreased and, as a result, many of the covered installations ended up with surplus EUAs. These surpluses caused the market price for allowances to plummet, in addition to taking the pressure off installations to shift toward reducing GHG. The Carbon Price Floor scheme, which came into effect April 1, 2013, ensures that it does not become cheaper for installations to pollute rather than improve energy effciency and cleanliness by imposing an annually increasing surcharge on top of the market price of EUAs for installations that are fossil fuel-burning power stations. By most accounts, the UK’s carbon price floor has been successful in producing cost-effective emissions reductions. By facilitating the switch from oil to gas, it has also contributed to large-scale emissions reductions (80 percent from 2012 to 2016).
The Market Stability Reserve is another mechanism introduced to solve the problem of surplus EUAs causing a disincentive to reduce GHG emissions. This mechanism, which will be in force from 2019, is designed to automatically withdraw a proportion of EUAs available on the carbon market and place them into a reserve once the number of freely available allowances reaches a certain threshold. In theory, this will increase the demand for allowances and stabilize their price. If the number of available allowances should drop below a set threshold, some allowances will be released from the reserve.
The Paris Agreement will also likely have a considerable impact on the future of emissions trading in the UK and around the world. The agreement provides for the international connection of emission trading systems to facilitate the meeting of each country’s commitment under the Agreement via so-called "internationally transferred mitigation outcomes." The Paris Agreement provides no detail, however, on how such a mechanism would be developed, and at present emissions trading around the world lacks the uniformity for the various systems to become interconnected.
Trading across borders.
The UK ETS is inextricably linked to, and indeed a branch of, the EU-wide scheme provided for in the EU ETS Directive. As the carbon market is EU-wide and there is mutual recognition of EUAs across the EU, UK ETS allowances may be freely traded by installations throughout the EU.
Having one of the biggest economies in the EU, the UK is a major player in the EU ETS both in terms of influencing policy and market activity. The EU ETS is in essence a vehicle that helps both the UK and the EU as a whole reduce their GHG emissions and meet international commitments, in particular the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Through the 2004 Linking Directive, the EU ETS is linked to other emissions reduction schemes provided for under the Kyoto Protocol, namely Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism. Credits earned under these schemes (emission reduction units (ERUs) and certifed emission reductions (CERs) respectively) may be used in lieu of EUAs for compliance with the EU ETS.
It is unclear what the effect of Brexit will be on the UK ETS.
Effect of Brexit.
It is unclear what the effect of Brexit will be on the UK ETS given its connection to the wider EU scheme. If, upon leaving the EU, the UK chooses to leave the EU ETS but seeks continued access to the EU carbon market, this would need to be negotiated. The terms of access may be contained in a free trade agreement (should one be agreed to) with the EU.
Although Brexit's immediate effects are not known, it is predicted that for the UK ETS, the effects are not likely to be dramatic, as many of the legal bases for the UK ETS are now derived directly from domestic law. Nonetheless, new policies will be needed to ensure continued efforts at reducing GHG emissions where previous policies were mandated through the EU, and the government has declared its intention to do this. The UK's targets as part of the global transition to a low-carbon economy and to combat the effects of climate change will remain independent of the EU stance. The UK is a participant in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in its own capacity as well as in its role as part of the EU; therefore, its obligations under these agreements are not dependent on its membership in the EU.
Through the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK is required to establish carbon budgets to ensure progress in GHG emissions reduction and other climate change-related commitments. Although the UK's 2050 GHG reduction targets and the legislated carbon budgets (including the recent fifth carbon budget, which runs from 2028 to 2032) remain intact, going forward the UK's carbon budgets need to be adaptable to the reality of an uncertain future if the UK is to meet its global commitments. This includes addressing the prediction that one of Brexit's consequences and the uncertainty during negotiations will be an economic downturn for the UK. This may potentially lead to a reduction in GHG emissions, simply as a result of reductions in industrial output, lower energy consumption and other economic consequences. Having ratifed the Paris Agreement, the UK will need to submit its own commitments and targets for carbon reduction actions into 2050. The UK's access to the low-cost emission reduction market of the EU ETS is an important mechanism for achieving targets set by the UK. Whether Brexit means that the UK cannot continue to participate in the EU ETS after leaving the EU is an open question.
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